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Article 38 (1) (a) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists as one of the sources 
applied by the Court ‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’. This ob-
scure reference to the standard of civilization today serves no more purpose, however, until the 
first half of the 20th century it functioned as one of the structural principles of international law. 
This short article aims at introducing the concept and its effects on international relations and 
its disappearance from the normative framework of international law. 
 
 
II. The Standard of Civilization  
 
Until the 19th century international law was considered to be applicable to all interactions be-
tween states. Even in a discipline with a distinctly European origin1 the natural law heritage 
necessitated the acceptance of the universal reach of the law of nations extending it to non-
European civilizations.2 Thus Alexandrowicz convincingly argued that between the 17th and 
the 18th centuries, East Indian and European sovereigns interacted on relatively equal footing 
                                                          
* Senior Research Fellow, HAS Centre for Social Sciences Institute for Legal Studies. This paper was written 
with the funding of the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund OTKA (Project PD 113010). 
1 Neff represents the majority opinion in international legal scholarship when declares that ‘Like any man-made 
system, international law must inevitably bear traces of the historical context in which it was formed. That meant, 
specifically, that international law must be acknowledged to be, first and foremost, a product of European civili-
zation.’ See Stephen C. NEFF, Justice Among Nations – A History of International Law, Cambridge: Massachu-
setts 2014, 310. For 19th and early 20th century legal scholars this was self-evident. One of the leading international 
law textbooks, Hall’s International Law correspondingly explained that ‘[I]t is scarcely necessary to point out that 
as international law is a product of the special civilisation of modern Europe, and forms a highly artificial system 
of which the principles cannot be supposed to be understood or recognised by countries differently civilised, such 
states only can be presumed to be subject to it as are inheritors of that civilization.‘ William Edward HALL - James 
Beresford ATLAY, A Treatise on International Law, Oxford 1909, 39. See however recent attempts to trace the 
non-European lineage of international law. Inter alia Fatiha SAHLI - Abdelmalek El OUAZZANI, Africa North 
of the Sahara and Arab Countries, in: The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, Bardo FASS-
BENDER - Anne PETERS - Simone PETER - Daniel HÖGGER (eds.), Oxford 2013, 385-406; James Thuo 
GATHII, Africa, in: FASSBENDER – PETERS – PETER – HÖGGER (eds.), Oxford Handbook, 407-428. 
2 On the doctrinal approach see Martti Koskenniem, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribu-
tion, in: University of Toronto Law Journal, 61, 2011, 1-36.   
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and concluded a series of treaties reflecting mutually agreed principles.3 In this vein a British 
Admiralty Court ruling matter-of-factly stated that ‘African States… have long acquired the 
character of established governments, with whom we have regular treaties, acknowledging and 
confirming to them the relations of legal states…’4 However, in the 19th century this approach 
based on legal equality ‘gave way to notions of European superiority’5 and civilization became 
the most important concept to determine the applicability of international law outside a Euro-
pean context. This way ‘the doctrinal shift from naturalism to positivism transformed a univer-
sal law of peoples into a regional European international law.’6 
 The notion of civilization was based on an underlying belief in general progress and the 
conviction that European culture represents the pinnacle of development. It became firmly es-
tablished in European scholarship that Europeans ‘were endowed with an advanced level of 
social complexity in opposition to 'barbarous' nations, who could possibly acquire civilization 
if they conformed to certain values, or 'savages', who were condemned to never access it.’7 
Consequently, only civilized countries could aspire to become members of family of nations.8  
 Hegel conveniently summarised this view by explaining that  
 
‘Civilised Nations [are justified] in regarding and treating as barbarians those who lag 
behind them in institutions which are the essential moments of the State. Thus a pastoral 
people may treat hunters as barbarians and both of these are barbarians from the point 
of view of agriculturalists etc. The civilised nation is conscious that the rights of the 
barbarians are unequal to its own and treats their autonomy as only a formality.’9 
                                                          
3 Charles Henry ALEXANDROWICZ, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies, 
Oxford 1967. 
4 The Helena (1801) 4 C. Rob 4. 
5 Julius GOEBEL, The Equality of States, New York 1923, 5. 
6 Arnulf Becker LORCA, Mestizo International Law – A Global Intellectual History 1842-1933, Cambridge  2014, 
47. 
7 Liliana OBREGÓN, The Civilized and the Uncivilized, in: The Oxford Handbook of the History of International 
Law, Bardo FASSBENDER - Anne PETERS - Simone PETER - Daniel HÖGGER (eds.), Oxford 2013, 917. 
8 19th century legal documents are replete with references to the standard of civilization. For instance, the Decla-
ration against the Slave Trade, signed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, declared that slave trade is ‘repugnant to 
the principles of humanity and universal morality . . . the public voice, in all civilized countries, calls aloud for its 
prompt suppression.’ Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, Act No. XV., Declaration of the Powers on the Aboli-
tion of the Slave Trade, signed on 8 February 1815. http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Final_Act_of_the_Con-
gress_of_Vienna/Act_XV 50 years later, the first international treaty renouncing a particular means of warfare, 
the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration enunciated that there is an ‘expediency of forbidding the use of certain pro-
jectiles in times of war between civilized nations’ since ‘the progress of civilization should have the effect of 
alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war’. 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in 
Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, opened for signature 11 December 1868 (entry 
into force 11 December 1868). 
9 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Philosophy of Right, Oxford 1979) Part 3: Ethical Life, (iii) The State (c) 
World History. Other philosophers concurred. In similar fashion, John Stuart Mill explained that ‘the rules of 




The requirements to be fulfilled for a country to meet the standard of civilization was never 
explicitly spelled out and Koskenniemi rightly points out that its existence was a ‘myth in the 
sense that there was never anything to gain. Every concession was a matter of negotiation, every 
status dependent on agreement, quid pro qua. But the existence of a language of a standard still 
gave the appearance of fair treatment and regular administration to what was ... a conjectural 
policy.... Without such language, it would have been impossible to... explain, let alone to justify, 
why non-European communities could be subjected to massive colonization.’10 In other words, 
the standard of civilization was a convenient point of reference to justify unequal relationship 
between countries and to deny the recognition of statehood of certain political communities. 
 Still, contemporary international legal documents, judicial decisions and especially le-
gal scholarship have elucidated what these requirements could be. Gong found five such criteria 
that ‘reflected the norms of the liberal European civilization which arose to replace, though it 
remained firmly rooted in, the mores of Christendom.'11 These requirements were (1) guaran-
tees for basic civil rights of liberty, dignity, property, freedom of travel, commerce, and reli-
gion, especially that of foreign nationals; (2) an efficient government; (3) compliance with in-
ternational law; (4) adequate and permanent diplomatic relationship; and (5) conformity to the 
cultural norms and practices of the 'civilized' international society, i.e. the prohibition of inter 
alia slavery, polygamy or suttee.12 More succinctly Schwarzenberger submitted that ‘it may be 
concluded without undue generalization that a civilised state must give protection to the life, 
liberty and property of foreigners more or less in accordance with the liberal traditions of the 
“bürgerliche Rechtsstaat”’.13 
 If a country fulfilled some of these requirements (or if due to political expediency it was 
deemed worthy to be treated as a European country)14 it was recognized as a member of the 
                                                          
on for observing any rules. Their minds are not capable of so great an effort, nor their will sufficiently under the 
influence of distant motives… The only moral laws for the relation between a civilized and a barbarous govern-
ment are the universal rules of morality between man and man.’ John Stuart MILL, A Few Words on Non-inter-
vention, in: John Stuart MILL, Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical,  Boston 
1867, Vol. 4, 171-172. 
10 Martti KOSKENNIEMI, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations - The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960, 
Cambridge 2004, 134-135. 
11 Gerrit W. GONG, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society, Oxford 1984, 14. 
12 GONG, 14-21. 
13 Georg SCHWARZENBERGER, The Rule of Law and the Disintegration of the International Society, in: Amer-
ican Journal of International Law, 33, 1939, 64.  
14 Koskenniemi brilliantly demonstrates the inherent problems with the standard of civilization. ’Here was the 
paradox: if there was no external standard for civilization, then everything depended on what Europeans approved. 
What Europeans approved, again, depended on the degree to which aspirant communities were ready to play by 
European rules. But the more eagerly the non-Europeans wished to prove that they played by European rules, the 
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international community. Thus the Ottoman Empire became in 1856 the first non-European 
country admitted to ‘participate in the public law and concert in Europe’.15 However, recogni-
tion as a sovereign did not automatically result in equal rights. Even though by the 19th century 
the formal sovereign equality was generally accepted as the fundamental rule of international 
law,16 such countries were subjected to a different legal regime. Since they were thought inca-
pable of ensuring adequate level of protection of civil rights they were deprived of certain sov-
ereign rights and jurisdictional immunities in ‘unequal treaties’ and capitulations.17 This ap-
proach in effect created a two-tiered international legal order. ‘At one level, were the full mem-
bers of the society of states enjoying all the rights and benefits of such membership. At the 
other level, were the relations between these full members and other entities within the wider 
system… Statehood thus enabled a state to enjoy membership of the system but this did not 
guarantee membership of the society of states.’18 These countries could have been functionally 
sufficiently similar to European countries (i.e. possessing effective government, bureaucracy 
etc.) but culturally they were still too different to be accepted as equals.19 
 However, the gap between Western “civilized” countries and non-Christian countries 
was not unbridgeable.20 Japan’s example clearly demonstrates that Asian countries could be 
deemed to have reached the standard of civilization and thus become members with equal rights 
in the international community.  
                                                          
more suspect they became: had not Bluntschli argued that only “non-Aryans” bowed down in front of their mas-
ters? In order to attain equality, the non-European community must accept Europe as its master – but to accept a 
master was proof that one was not equal.’ KOSKENNIEMI, The Gentle Civilizer, 135-136. 
15 Art. 7 of the Treaty of Paris (1856) 
16 In 1825, in the Antelope Case, Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court affirmed that: ‘No 
principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations… It results from 
this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another.’ 10 Wheat 66, 122 (1825). 
17 The Ottoman Empire was also subject to repeated Western interventions partly due to its ’semi-civilized’ state. 
See Davide RODOGNO, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire (1815–1914) – 
The Birth of a Concept and International Practice, Princeton 2012. 
18 Gerry SIMPSON, Great Powers and Unequal States – Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, 
Cambridge 2004, 235. (emphasis in the original) 
19 In a manner characteristic to contemporary international legal scholarship Wheaton explained that ’ The ordinary 
jus gentium is only a particular law, applicable to a distinct set or family of nations, varying at different times with 
the change in religion, manners of government, and other institutions, among every class of nations. Hence the 
international law of the civilised, Christian nations of Europe and America, is one thing; and that which governs 
the intercourse of the Mohammedan nations of the East with each other, and with Christians, is another and a very 
different thing…’ Henry WHEATON, Elements of International Law with a Sketch of the History of the Science, 
Philadelphia 1836, 44-45. 
20 Though of course certain scholars viewed it that way. For Martens, interactions between civilized and uncivilized 
countries were simple de facto interactions outside the purview of international law and concluded that ‘[L]es 
conditions sociales et politiques dans lesquelles vivent les peoples musulmans et les peuplades païennes et 
sauvages, rendent impossible l’application de droit international aux rapports avec ces nations barbares ou à moitié 
civilises (the social and political conditions under which Muslim, heathen or savage peoples live, render impossible 
the application of international law with these barbarous or half civilized nations).’ Fedor Fedorovich MARTENS, 
Traité de droit international, Paris 1883, 238-239. 
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 In 1853, an American warship forced Japan to end its two hundred years of seclusion 
by allowing foreign trade. Japan – just like China or Siam earlier – was forced to conclude 
unequal treaties with the Great Powers and accept consular jurisdiction over foreign citizens. 
International law was completely unknown and the American consul Townsend Harris, who 
had arrived in Shimoda in 1856, found Japan ‘undemocratic’ and ‘uncivilized’, making it his 
‘personal mission’ to ‘bring the heathen country under the laws of nations.’21  
 One of strategic goals of Japan to remedy its subordinated position was the acceptance 
of international law as a regulatory framework. In 1865, one of the most widely used interna-
tional law monographs, Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law was published in Jap-
anese22 and in 1868 Japan officially declared that it would conduct its foreign affairs in accord-
ance with public international law.23 The full embrace of the standard of civilization – along 
with the growing economic and military might of Japan – soon proved to be successful.  In 
1888, Japan concluded with Mexico its first treaty of amity, commerce and navigation under 
conditions of absolute equality and in 1894, Japan signed its first treaty with a Great Power, 
Great Britain, under equality. This was a clear sign that the Far-Eastern country had become 
acknowledged as a civilized nation and in quick succession all the unequal treaties signed the 
United States, France, Germany and other European states were also revised.24 
 The final proof of Japan’s ascendance to the rank of civilized states was its victory in 
the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese war. Not only did Japan manage to defeat Russia, one of the su-
preme military powers of the world but it did so by strict adherence to the laws of war. It con-
firmed that ‘Japan could articulate its sovereignty with the full approval of its allies and the 
grudging respect of its enemies.’25 
 This rapid rise was duly reflected in contemporary international legal scholarship as 
well. Westlake, for instance, in 1894 affirmed that ‘[O]ur international society exercises the 
                                                          
21 Masao MIYOSHI, As We Saw Them, The First Japanese Embassy to the United States (1860), Berkeley 1979, 
16. 
22 Interestingly, the Japanese edition was translated from the Chinese edition of the book. See more in detail Lydia 
H. Liu, Legislating the Universal: The Circulation of International Law in the Nineteenth Century, in: Tokens of 
Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations, Lydia H. Liu (ed.), Durham & London 1999, 127-
164. 
23 Klaus SCHLICHTMANN, Japan, Germany and the Idea of the Hague Peace Conferences, in: Journal of Peace 
Research, 40, 2003, 386. In the same year the first international law treatise written by a Japanese author, Nishi 
Amane, was published. See Urs Matthias ZACHMANN, Does Europe Include Japan? European Normativity in 
Japanese Attitudes towards International Law, 1854–1945, in: Rechtsgesichte – Legal History, 22, 2014, 230.  
24 LORCA, 114-115. Howland, on the other hand, argues that the concept of civilization never had an actual effect 
on Japan’s international relations and served only as ‘a point of political rhetoric which the Western powers used 
to maintain their privileges in Japan’. Douglas HOWLAND, International Law and Japanese Sovereignty – The 
Emerging Global Order in the 19th Century, Palgrave 2016, 4.  
25 Douglas HOWLAND, Sovereignty and the Laws of War: International Consequences of Japan's 1905 Victory 
over Russia, in: Law and History Review, 29, 2011, 53-97. 
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right of admitting outside states to parts of its international law without necessarily admitting 
them to the whole of it. Thus a large part of the relations between the European and American 
states on the one hand, and China and Japan on the other hand, is conducted on the footing of 
ordinary international law; but the former enjoy in the latter a consular jurisdiction, substituted 
for the rules of jurisdiction belonging to ordinary international law’26 In 1904 he retained his 
view concerning other Asian countries27 but declared that ‘Japan has recently been raised from 
this class of states to the full community of international law. The consular jurisdiction there 
having been given up in pursuance of treaties with the European and American powers con-
cluded with that empire, and which came into force in 1899’.28 Other influential authors, such 
as Holland followed suit.29 
 However, there was general agreement that not all non-Christian people could become 
civilized in the foreseeable future. Indeed, many contemporary authors were adamant that “non-
civilized”, barbarous” or savage” people were biologically incapable of complying with the 
normative regulation of international law.30 Thus, in the 19th century 'the superhuman entered 
history with its hostile twin: the subhuman'31 The imperative of mission civilizatrice, the need 
of bringing the wonders of European civilization became the standard justification for coloni-
zation32  and if this civilizing mission resulted in the exploitation and death of thousands, well, 
that was still an acceptable price in the eyes of contemporary international lawyers.  
                                                          
26 John WESTLAKE, Chapters on the Principles of International Law, Cambridge 1894, 82. 
27 ’Beyond the above limits the international society exercises the right of admitting states to parts of its law 
without admitting them to the whole of it. Such is the case with Morocco, Turkey, Muscat, Persia, Siam and China. 
The European and American states maintain diplomatic intercourse and conclude treaties with them, they regard 
their territories as being held by titles of the same kind as those by which they hold their own, and when at war 
with them they regard the laws of war as being reciprocally binding just as between themselves. But the civilisation 
of those countries differs from that of the Christian world in such important particulars, especially in the family 
relations and in the criminal law and its administration, that it is deemed necessary for Europeans and Americans 
among them to be protected by the enjoyment of a more or less separate system of law under their consuls.’ John 
WESTLAKE, International Law: Part I Peace, Cambridge 1904, 40. 
28 Ibid, 41.  
29 See more in detail LORCA, 111-115. 
30 Contemporary scholarship often resorted to biological and anthropological arguments. Analysing the works of 
Cambridge law professor Thomas J. Lawrence, Riles observes that ‘texts are replete with references to the crude 
biological nature of the “race of savages” and the “dwarfs of the Central African forest,” for example. The thrill 
of the racialized savage – the thrill of racism – is the thrill of catagorizing, of ordering, of controlling; and Law-
rence’s use of this imagery in his treatise imputed this thrill to international law…’ Annelise RILES, Aspiration 
and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentialization of Culture, in: Harvard Law Review, 106, 
1993, 729. 
31 Carl SCHMITT, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, New York 
2003, 104. 
32 In the opening speech of the 1884-85 Africa Conference for instance Prince Bismarck noted that ‘all the Gov-
ernments invited share the wish to bring the natives of Africa within the pale of civilization by opening up the 
interior of the continent to commerce…’ See Anthony ANGHIE, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law, Cambridge 2005, 97. Orford insightfully remarks that ‘[T]he hero’s journey is about civilisa-
tion, progress or development of that colonised subject. Intervention by white men is justified in order first to 
civilise the natives of subject colonies, and later, in the era of decolonisation, to assist the development of those 
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 Still, international law could apply to a limited extent even to the ‘savages’. Even though 
they did not possess sovereignty they had the right to transfer ownership of their land to the 
colonizing powers.33 As put pithily by Anghie: ‘[T]he basic point is that the development of the 
idea of sovereignty in relation to the non-European world occurs in terms of dispossession, its 
ability to alienate its lands and rights… the native is granted personality in order to be bound’.34  
 To sum up, utilising the concept of civilization, 19th century international legal practice 
and scholarship has created an elaborate system of inequality while simultaneously honouring 
sovereign equality as the basic principle of international law.35 This approach reached its pin-
nacle but also its inevitably demise at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences. 
 
III. The Pinnacle and Decline of the Concept of Civilization at the 1899 and 
1907 Hague Peace Conferences 
 
In 1898, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia convened an unusual peace conference aimed not at con-
cluding a war between nations but preventing its possible outbreak by establishing arms reduc-
tion, drafting legal regulation for the conduct of hostilities and creating means for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. The first Peace Conference was held in 1899, hosted by the Kingdom of 
Netherlands in the Hague.36  
 The influence of the standard of civilization was palpable at the Conference. Already in 
the proposal for the convocation of the conference the Tsar emphasized that ‘In the course of 
the last twenty years the longings for a general appeasement have become especially pro-
nounced in the consciences of civilized nations.’37 Unsurprisingly, out of 26 participating del-
egations 20 were European powers and since the United States and Mexico attended the con-
                                                          
former colonies.’ Anne ORFORD, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law, Cambridge 2003, 171. 
33 Lorimer for instance emphasized that the international lawyer ’is not bound to apply the positive law of nations 
to savages, or even to barbarians, as such; but he is bound to ascertain the points at which, and the directions in 
which, barbarians or savages come within the scope of partial recognition.’ James LORIMER, The Institutes of 
the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, Edinburgh  1883, Vol. 
I., 102. 
34 ANGHIE, 105. 
35 It must be pointed out, however, that not only non-Christian countries but semi-peripherial states such as Latin-
American countries and Russia also had to struggle to prove that they had met the criteria of the standard of 
civilization. See more in detail LORCA, Mestizo International Law.  
36 For further background see Betsy BAKER, Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907), in: Max Planck Ency-
clopaedia of Public International Law, Rudiger WOLFRUM (ed), http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL 
37 Handed to diplomatic representatives by Count Mouravieff, Russian Foreign Minister, at weekly reception in 
the Foreign Office, St. Petersburg, August 24, 1898. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hag99-01.asp  
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ference, only 4 non-Christian countries were represented: China, Japan, Persia and Siam. Be-
sides the selective invitation, creative seating also ensured the dominance of great powers –
French alphabetical arrangement resulted in all the major powers being seated in the front row.38 
 The standard of civilization was repeatedly referred to during discussions at the Confer-
ence and in adopted treaty as well. The preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention (II) asserted 
that: 
 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and 
the rule of the principles of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages established 
among civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public con-
science.”39 
 
This formulation, widely known as “Martens Clause”, named after the famous Russian jurist 
Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens, who suggested the inclusion of a general reference to unwritten 
principles to resolve a diplomatic deadlock during the negotiations,40 was restated in the pre-
amble of the 1907 Hague Convention IV, which emphasized that it was paramount to ‘serve, 
even in this extreme case, the interest of humanity and the ever progressive needs of civiliza-
tion’,41 while a slightly modified version appeared in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
                                                          
38 Hull explains that ’ In arranging the seats of the delegates, the alphabetical list of the countries, according to 
their names in the French language, was followed; and this arrangement brought all of the great powers to the 
front, — the Russians, as initiators of the conference, being seated around the president, who was also a Russian. 
The French name for the United States {Etats Unis d'Amerique) would have placed its representatives seventh on 
the list; but either because this arrangement would have seated its delegates next to those of Spain (Espagne), with 
whom it had recently been at war, or because of its commanding position in the New World, it was classed as 
Amerique, second on the list, and just after Germany (Allemagne).’ William I. HULL, The Two Hague Peace 
Conferences and Their Contributions to International Law, Boston 1908, 12. 
39 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 29 July 1899 (entry into force 4 September 1900).  
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documen-
tId=9FE084CDAC63D10FC12563CD00515C4D (last visited: 13 December 2014).  
40 See more in detail Antonio CASSESE, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, in: European 
Journal of International Law, 11, 2000, 193-198. 
41 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18 October 1907 
(entry into force 26 January 1910). Roberts/Guelff: Documents on the Laws of War, p. 69.  
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Conventions,42 and it was incorporated into numerous other conventions regulating the means 
and methods of warfare.43  
 Yet, the most conspicuous example of the differentiation between civilized and 
uncivilized emerged during the debates concerning the prohibition of expanding (dum-dum) 
bullets. Even though Great Britain supported the proposed ban, it made a case for an exception 
in colonial conflicts. The British representative, Sir John Ardagh scornfully argued that:  
 
In civilized war a soldier penetrated by a small projectile is wounded, withdraws to the 
ambulance, and does not advance any further. It is very different with a savage. Even 
though pierced two or three times, he does not cease to march forward, does not call 
upon the hospital attendants, but continues on, and before anyone has time to explain to 
him that he is flagrantly violating the decision of the Hague Conference, he cuts off your 
head.44 
 Ultimately, the British proposal was defeated, yet, in practice dum-dum bullets could still be 
used during colonial warfare since these conflicts did not amount to proper wars as these were 
only conducted between sovereign countries.45 
 The 1907 Second Peace Conference partially improved the representation of non-Euro-
pean states since this time 19 Latin-American countries participated. The increased number of 
participation fundamentally changed the dynamic of the conference. The Latin-American coun-
tries, led by the head of the Brazilian delegation, Ruy Barbosa, fought for the actual recognition 
                                                          
42Art. 1 (2) declares that ”[I]n cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians 
and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from es-
tablished custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.” Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3 (entry into force 7 December 1979). 
43 See inter alia, the reference to ‘the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity’ in the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), opened for signature 18 September 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S 2041 (entry into 
force 1 March 1999); or the affirmation that “the rules governing the protection of cultural property in the event 
of armed conflict should reflect developments in international law”, Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 
1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, opened for signature 26 March 1999, 
2253 U.N.T.S. 212 (entry into force 9 March 2004).                           
44 James B. SCOTT, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1909, 
Vol. I., 343. 
45 See Tamás HOFFMANN, An Eternal Promise? – Three Sketches on the Universality of International Humani-
tarian Law, in: Enikő DÁCZ, Christina GRIESSLER and Henriett KOVÁCS (eds.) Der Traum vom Frieden? – 
Utopie oder Realitaet?, Berlin 2015, 250-257. In this vein, Holls emphasized that ‘The Peace Conference certainly 
did not condemn the struggles which must necessarily precede the triumph of a higher civilization over that of a 
lower type which advancing standards of conduct may soften, but can never wholly prevent.’ Frederick W. 




of sovereign equality of states and managed to maintain in effect unanimity in decision-making 
which – although formalistic in nature – ensured the influence of even the smaller nations.46  
In the end, the focus on the principle of sovereign equality inevitably resulted in the 
steady abandonment of the concept of standard of civilization. Even though a Japanese proposal 
at the Versailles Peace Conference to include a racial equality clause into the Covenant of the 
League of Nations was defeated47 and the rhetoric of civilization was still employed in the 
interwar period to justify violence in colonial territories48, the legal discourse has slowly but 
irrevocably changed. Already in 1927 the renowned German international lawyer Walter 
Schücking referred to the concept as an ‘arrogant distinction’ between civilized and uncivi-
lized49 and by 1944 the last unequal treaty concluded with China was withdrawn, thus fully 




The standard of civilization was never a fixed concept yet ‘it remained a gatekeeper to admis-
sion in the international order spawned by the European state system well into the early twen-
tieth century’.50 It served as a useful instrument for European powers to determine the terms of 
engagement with non-European countries, constantly changing the applicable legal framework 
but at the same time maintaining moral superiority. 
 The idea of Western superiority has lost all intellectual currency by the end of World 
War II and Art. 1 (3) Charter of the United Nations explicitly prescribed ‘promoting and en-
couraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
                                                          
46 Gerry SIMPSON, Great Powers and Unequal States – Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, 
Cambridge 2004, 134-140. 
47 See Kenneth KEITH, 100 Years of International Arbitration and Adjudication, in: Melbourne Journal of Inter-
national Law, 15, 2014, 5-7. 
48 The most egregious example was the defence of the 1926 French bombing of Damascus by the prominent Bri-
tish military lawyer, Elbridge Colby, who argued that Colby held that ‘If a few “non-combatants” – if there be 
any such in native folk of this character – are killed, the loss of life is probably far less than might have been 
sustained in prolonged operations of a more polite character. The inhuman act thus becomes actually humane, 
for it shortens the conflict and prevents the shedding of more excessive quantities of blood.’ Elbridge COLBY, 
How to Fight Savage Tribes, in: American Journal of International Law, 21, 1927, 287. 
49 1927 expert opinion concerning the question of the termination of the Chinese-Belgian Treaty of 1865, cited in 
Robert Hauser, China and Developments in International Law: Wang Tieya as a Contemporary, in: Journal of the 
History of International Law, 4, 2002, 145. It must be pointed out that the 3rd edition of the influential international 
law treatise, Oppenheim’s International Law, already in 1920 emphasized that ‘The equality before International 
Law of all member States of the Family of Nations is an invariable equality derived from their international per-
sonality. Whatever inequality may exist between states as regards their size, power, degree of civilisation, wealth 
and other qualities, they are nevertheless equals as international persons.’ Lassa OPPENHEIM – Hersch LAU-
TERPACHT, International Law, A Treatise, London 1920, vol.I., 15. 
50 Umut ÖZSU, Agency, Universality, and the Politics of International Legal History, in: Harvard International 
Law Journal, 52, 2010, 61. 
1 
 
to race, sex, language, or religion’ as one of the purposes of the United Nations.51 The uncivi-
lized or savage may no longer ‘provided the symbolic counterpoint to… [the] ordering func-
tions of international law’52 yet there are unceasing attempts to reinvent the standard of civili-
zation.53 Still, even if the normative regulation of public international law is constantly and 
often justifiably criticised, the history of the standard of civilisation cautions against  introduc-




                                                          
51 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 16 (entry into force 24 October 
1945). Although the vestiges of the idea of distinction between civilized and non-civilized nations remained in the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice with the reference to ’general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations’ as a source of international law in Art. 38 (1) (c). Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for 
signature 26 June 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (entry into force 24 October 1945). 
52 RILES, 730. 
53 See Brett BOWDEN, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea, Chicago 2009, 161-188. 
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